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COMMENT
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-
EXECUTIVE OFFICER LIABILITY
It is fundamental in workmen's compensation law that by
assuming no-fault liability for industrial accidents, the employer
is afforded immunity from proceedings in tort.' It is equally
fundamental, however, that the compensation remedy is exclu-
sive only between employer and employee; claims against third
parties remain unaffected.2 Most jurisdictions,8 including Louisi-
ana,4 have held that coemployees, including those in the highest
levels of management, are "third parties" and hence subject to
suit in tort.
During the last decade in Louisiana, there have been nu-
merous "third party actions" against corporate executive offi-
cers, most often predicated on alleged negligent omissions.5 The
popularity of these actions can be attributed to liability insur-
ance coverage provided by the corporation. It has been sug-
gested that, as a result of executive officer liability, the policy
of the Workmen's Compensation Act has been undermined."
It is indeed difficult to deny that when the third party executive
1. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1972).
2. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 71.10 (1972).
3. Id. § 72.10.
4. See, e.g., Chaney v. Brupbacher, 242 So.2d 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970);
Berry v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 So.2d 243 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Bou-
dreaux v. Falco, 215 So.2d 538 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Daigle v. Cobb, 175
So.2d 392 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Adams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 107 So.2d
496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958); Vidrine v. Solleau, 38 So.2d 77 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1948); Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
A working partner is considered an "employee" in Louisiana and hence
eligible for workmen's compensation benefits. See Trappery v. Lumbermen's
Mut. Cas. Co., 229 La. 632, 86 So.2d 515 (1956). Therefore, it would seem that
working partners are also "third persons" within the meaning of the Lou-
isiana Workmen's Compensation Act. But see Sonberg v. Bergere, 220 Cal.
App. 2d 681, 34 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1963). It has been held, however, that non-
working partners are not considered "employees" of the partnership and
therefore cannot be liable in tort as coemployee third persons. See Leger
v. Townsend, 257 So.2d 761 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
5. See, e.g., LeJeune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 261 So.2d 280 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1972); Maxey v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 255 So.2d 120 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1971); Spillers v. Northern Assurance Co. of America, 254 So.2d 125
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Berry v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 So.2d 243 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Continental Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 336 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1968); Jolly v. Travelers Ins. Co., 161 So.2d 354 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964); Adams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 107 So.2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
6. Berry v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 So.2d 243, 249 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1970). See aZso Adams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 107 So.2d 496, 500 (La. App.
let Cir. 1958).
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is found liable by the court, the injured employee receives both
the benefit of the Workmen's Compensation Act and a recovery
in damages that the act forbids him to exact from his "em-
ployer. '7 Perhaps for this reason the courts have been reluctant
to find executive officer liability, and have employed various
fictions in an effort to restrict it. As a result, there is presently
no clear definition of the legal duty, a breach of which gives
rise to executive officer liability. The purpose of this Comment
is to survey generally the sources of confusion in Louisiana law
and to suggest what is hopefully a more realistic approach to
executive officer liability in tort.
The Nonfeasance Rule
In early English cases the rule developed that an agent was
liable to third persons for his malfeasance or misfeasance, but
not for his nonfeasance.8 This rule was based on the premise
that tort liability for the breach of contractual obligations should
be restricted to those with whom the obligor stood in privity.
Thus, since no privity existed between the agent and the third
person, a mere failure to perform a contractual duty owed to
the principal, i.e., a nonfeasance, would result in the agent's
liability only to the principal.
This limitation was accepted in a minority of American
jurisdictions. The peculiar result was that the primary wrong-
doer escaped liability merely because his negligence was of a
passive nature.9 A majority of courts, however, ignored the rule
and held the agent liable by recognizing a legal duty owed to
7. "The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his
dependent on account of a personal injury for which he is entitled to com-
pensation under this Chapter shall be exclusive of all other rights and
remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or
relations." LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950).
8. See Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 488, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1467 (K.B.
1663); Marsh & Astreys Case, 1 Leonard 146, 74 Eng. Rep. 135 (K.B. 1609).
"Nonfeasance" Is defined as "the non-performance of some act which ought
to be performed . . . ." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1208 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
"Misfeasance" is defined as "[tihe improper performance of some act which
a man may lawfully do." Id. at 1151. "Malfeasance" is defined as "the com-
mission of some act which is positively unlawful .... " Id. at 1109.
9. Dean v. Brock, 11 Ind. App. 507, 38 N.E. 829 (1894); Williams v. Dean,
134 Iowa 216, 111 N.W. 931 (1907); Dudley v. Illinois C.R. Co., 127 Ky. 221,
96 S.W. 835 (1906); Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann. 1123 (1882); Feltus v.
Swan, 62 Miss. 415 (1884); Bissell v. Roden, 34 Mo. 63, 84 Am. Dec. 71 (1863);
Potter v. Gilbert, 196 N.Y. 576, 90 N.E. 1165 (1909); Henshaw v. Noble, 7
Ohio St. 226 (1857); Drake v. Hagan, 108 Tenn. 265, 67 S.W. 470 (1902);
Labadie v. Hawley, 61 Tex. 177, 48 Am. Rep. 278 (1884).
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the plaintiff.1 0 In accordance with this majority position, the
nonfeasance rule was rejected by the Restatement (Second) of
Agency."
The Restatement Rule
The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides that when an
agent undertakes to act for his principal' 2 under circumstances
where the agent should realize that some action is necessary
for the protection of another, liability will result from the agent's
subsequent failure to act.'3 The rationale of this rule is that by
undertaking to perform a service involving the safety of others,
the agent has induced the principal to "rest his oars" in reliance
upon that undertaking.14 Hence, by subsequently failing to act,
the agent has deprived the third person of some protection which
would have otherwise been provided by the principal. 5
10. Mayer v. Thompson-Hutchinson Bldg. Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 So. 620
(1894); Southern R. Co. v. Rowe, 2 Ga. App. 557, 59 S.E. 462 (1907); Baird
v. Shipman, 132 Ill. 16, 23 N.E. 384 (1890); Wells v. Hansen, 97 Kan. 305,
154 P. 1033 (1916); Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me. 552, 16 Am.
Rep. 503 (1873); Consolidated Gas Co. v. Connor, 114 Md. 140, 78 A. 725
(1910); Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437 (1881); Ellis v.
McNaughton, 76 Mich. 237, 42 N.W. 1113 (1889); Pittsfield Cottonwear Mfg.
Co. v. Pittsfield Shoe Co., 71 N.H. 522, 53 A. 807 (1902); Van Winkle v.
American Steam Boiler Co., 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 A. 472 (1890); New York &
W. Printing Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298, 78 Am. Dec. 338 (1860); Belvin
v. French, 84 Va. 81, 3 S.E. 891 (1887); Lough v. John Davis & Co., 30 Wash.
204, 70 P. 491 (1902).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 354, comment b (1957). The de-
cision to reject the nonfeasance rule Is supported by an abundance of well
reasoned criticism: "It is clear that an engineer at the throttle is in control
of a boiler . .. It is immaterial whether he ties down the safety valve or
fails to untie it, whether he 'affirmatively' injures the boiler or continues
to use a defective one. It would be absurd that a servant placed at the
open door of a tiger's cage with instructions to close the door when there
is any indication that the tiger will escape and who goes to sleep, is not
liable to a member of the public injured through the escape of the tiger
because he was guilty only of 'nonfeasance.'" Seavey, Liability of an Agent
in Tort, 1 So. L.Q. 23 (1916). See also 3 W. FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS 1161
(1947); F. MECHEM, AGENCY 348 (4th ed. 1952); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 85 (2d
ed. 1955); W. SEAVEY, LAw OF AGENCY § 133 (1964); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 97
(1922); Note, 21 LA. L. REv. 795, 798 (1961).
12. The terms "principal" and "agent" are used throughout this Com-
ment to avoid confusion. It appears settled in Louisiana that, in determin-
ing the liability of the principal or master, the distinction between servants
and non-servant agents is critical. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 215 So.2d
902 (1968); Comment, 33 LA. L. REV. 110 (1972). It should be noted that this
distinction is not determinative of the liability of servants and non-servant
agents. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 361, comment a (1957).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 354 (1957).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 354, comment a (1957).
15. Id.
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The Louisiana Jurisprudence
The nonfeasance rule emerged in Louisiana in Delaney v.
A. Rochereau & Co.,' wherein the supreme court refused to find
that agents of a nonresident building owner were liable for fail-
ing to properly maintain the premises. For nearly one-half
century the classic nonfeasance rule observed in Delaney was
applied in a variety of cases. 17 Finally, in Washington v. T.
Smith & Son, Inc.,18 the Orleans Court of Appeal held an agent
liable for negligent omissions resulting in personal injury to a
dockworker.
The honfeasance rule was again rejected in Adams v. Fidel-
ity and Casualty Co.,19 a workmen's compensation "third party
action" decided by the First Circuit Court of Appeal. The court
observed that when the breach of a legal duty owed to the
plaintiff occurs, "whether that breach is one of omission or com-
mission,"20 the defendant "director, officer, or agent"' 21 will be
liable. Unfortunately, the court did not further explain the cir-
cumstances under which such a duty would exist. The court in
Adams did, however, observe that an agent would not be liable
"if he has been guilty of no act or omission causing or con-
16. 34 La. Ann. 1123 (1882).
17. Tyler v. Walt, 184 La. 659, 167 So. 182 (1936) (bank failure case in
which Delaney was respectfully cited but "malfeasance" was found); Wirth
v. Albert, 174 La. 373, 141 So. 1 (1932) (the court, noting "an entire lack of
privity between plaintiff and defendants," denied recovery to plaintiff seek-
ing price of certain bonds); Ellet v. Newland, 171 La. 1019, 132 So. 761
(1931) (bank failure case wherein "malfeasance" permitted recovery); Allen
v, Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292 (1926) (bank depositors charged defen-
dants with omissions of duty and were denied recovery); McGuire v. Louisi-
ana Baptist Encampment, Inc., 199 So. 192 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940) (wrongful
death action wherein the court, although finding the decedent contributorily
negligent, apparently regarded Delaney as authoritative).
18. 68 So.2d 337 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953).
19. 107 So.2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
20. Id. at 508.
21. Id. Any notion that the nonfeasance rule had been abandoned by the
Louisiana courts was put to rest when, in Daigle v.. Cobb, 175 So.2d 392
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), it was employed to deny recovery. Later, the same
court, affirming its position in Daigle, denied recovery in Johnson v. Con-
tinental Insurance Co., 216 So.2d 336 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), noting "an
absence of malfeasance." Id. at 338. On balance, however, the position
adopted by the Adams court has been followed. See Dulaney v. Fruge, 257
So.2d 827 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Spillers v. Northern Assurance Co. of
America, 254 So.2d 125 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Maxey v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 255 So.2d 120 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); Chaney v. Brupbacher, 242 So.2d
627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Sampson v. Schultz, 242 So.2d 363 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1970); Berry v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 So.2d 243 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1970); Cacibauda v. Gaienne, 222 So.2d 632 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969);
Boudreaux v. Falco, 215 So.2d 538 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Jolly v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 161 So.2d 354 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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tributing to such injury or if he owes no duty to such third
person to use care, such as where the breach of duty com-
plained of is one owing only to the corporation.'2 2 (Empha-
sis added.)
The absence in the Adams decision of any clear refinement of
an agent's legal duty to third persons for negligent omissions
has resulted in varying attempts at definition of that duty28 and
concomitant confusion in the law. Two recent Third Circuit
decisions 24 illustrate this confusion.
In Spillers v. Northern Assurance Co. of America,2 one of
the defendants, president of the general contractor, was charged
with failing to supervise and failing to hire competent personnel.
The court, in denying recovery, applied the Restatement rule"
and concluded that since the duty to supervise had been dele-
gated to the construction superintendent, the defendant could
not be held liable.27 The court further observed that the defen-
dant had hired only two employees, the construction superin-
tendent and the estimator, both of whom were well qualified.
All other personnel had been hired and fired by the construction
22. Adams v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 107 So.2d 496, 505 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1958).
23. "We think an officer or director of a corporation owes a duty to the
corporation which is separate and independent of any duty which he may
owe to an employee or to a third person. The duty which he owes to the
corporation may include, among other things, a duty to provide safe work-
ing conditions for employees .... " Maxey v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 255
So.2d 120, 122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
"In our opinion the obligation of an employer and, within the limits of
their authority, of its supervisory personnel towards workmen is to provide
them with a working place and conditions which are reasonably safe con-
sidering the nature of the work." Chaney v. Brupbacher, 242 So.2d 627,
631 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
"I find it difficult to extend liability to any of the other corporate of-
ficers. Certainly, the poorly managed, almost non-existent safety program
constituted negligence on the part of the officer In charge of safety; but I
think his Inaction constitutes a breach of a general duty owed by him to
the corporation rather than of an individual responsibility to the plaintiff-
employee many echelons below him." Berry v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240
So.2d 243, 250 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970) (concurring opinion).
24. These cases were decided by different panels of judges.
25. 254 So.2d 125 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
26. Id. at 129.
27. "In considering the Adams decision it should be borne In mind that
the agent should not be held responsible to a third person for his mere
failure to perform an affirmative duty toward his principal unless (a) the
principal owed a duty of care toward the third person, and (b) this same
duty was delegated to the agent, who undertook its performance." Spillers
v. Northern Assurance Co. of America, 254 So.2d 125, 129 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1971). See al8o LeJeune v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 261 So.2d 280, 286 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion).
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superintendent. In essence, the court held that the defendant
president had not failed to properly discharge his particular job
function. 28 The supreme court denied writs with the comment
"[t]he result is correct."29
In Maxey v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,30 the court held
that the failure of various executive defendants to instigate
safety procedures was the breach of a duty owed only to the
corporation;81 hence, there could be no liability to the plaintiff.
The above reasoning is at variance with the Restatement rule
as applied in Spillers, under which a contractual duty to the cor-
poration to perform services involving the safety of others would
necessarily give rise to a legal duty owed to the plaintiff.3 2 In
contrast to the Spillers approach, the court in Maxey thus found
it unnecessary to consider whether defendants had failed to
properly discharge their particular job functions. The reasoning
of Maxey, if given full effect, constitutes a return to the non-
feasance rule by eliminating an agent's liability to third persons
for negligent omissions. The supreme court again denied writs
with the comment "[t]he result is correct."38
28. "Applying these [Restatement] rules to the present matter . . .
plaintiff has no claim against Mr. Weill for failure to supervise the work
or to hire competent personnel. Mr. Weill was not delegated the duty to
supervise the construction .... Furthermore, Weill did not undertake to
supervise construction." Spillers v. Northern Assurance Co. of America,
254 So.2d 125, 129 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
29. 260 La. 288, 255 So.2d 772 (1972).
30. 255 So.2d 120 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
31. "We think an officer or director of a corporation owes a duty to the
corporation which is separate and independent of any duty which he may
owe to an employee or to a third person. The duty which he owes to the
corporation may include, among other things, a duty to provide safe work-
ing conditions for employees .... ." Id. at 122.
32. "The writer of the present opinion concurred with the majority de-
cision in the Maxey case, but differed from the statement of law in certain
respects. The writer . . . could not agree that in every situation it is im-
material whether the agent has breached a [contractual] duty to his prin-
cipal. A simple illustration of this is the situation where an agent is in
charge of property, with the duty to cause all necessary repairs to be made.
In order to find the agent liable for an injury sustained by a third person,
due to the agent's neglect to keep the premises in repair, the agent's obli-
gation under the agency contract must be proved. Otherwise, the agent
would have no [legal] duty to the third person." (Emphasis added.) Spillers
v. Northern Assurance Co. of America, 254 So.2d 125, 128 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1971). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 354 (1957).
33. 260 La. 123, 255 So.2d 351 (1971). Applying the Restatement rule to
the facts of Maxey, the result does indeed seem correct. "[N]either of plain-
tiff's petitions allege that the duty owed by the corporation to the decedent
to furnish safe working conditions was delegated to these defendant execu-
tive officers nor that they undertook the performance of this duty." Maxey
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 255 So.2d 120, 124 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) (concur-
ring opinion). However, if the law set forth in Maxey (See note 31 supra)
COMMENT
A Suggested Approach
It is submitted that the rule set forth in section 354 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency provides the most reasonable
test of an agent's liability to third persons resulting from the
agent's failure to perform duties owed to his principal. That
section provides:
"An agent who, by promise or otherwise, undertakes to act
for his principal under such circumstances that some action
is necessary for the protection of the person or tangible
things of another, is subject to liability to the other for the
physical harm to him or his things caused by the reliance of
the principal or of the other upon his undertaking and his
subsequent unexcused failure to act, if such failure creates
an unreasonable risk of harm to him and the agent should
so realize. 3 4
The principle underlying this test is that the agent's failure
to act deprives the third person of protection that he would
otherwise receive from the principal.3 5 The fundamental con-
sideration in applying the Restatement rule should be the na-
ture of the "undertaking," i.e., the nature of the job that the
agent has expressly or impliedly agreed to perform for his prin-
cipal.46 It seems that only when the agent has failed to perform
his particular job function can he be said to have deprived the
third person of protection which would have otherwise been
provided by the principal. For instance, it is clear that an em-
ployer owes a duty to his employees to provide them with a
working place reasonably safe under the circumstances. 7 Of
practical necessity, this duty must be delegated down the chain
of command. Certainly, when the duty has been properly dele-
gated by an agent, he should not be liable for its breach.P
was applied in a case where the defendant had in fact undertaken to per-
form a service involving the safety of others, the effect would be to relieve
the primary wrongdoer of the consequences of his negligent behavior.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 354 (1957).
35. IU., comment a. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
36. "Central to these [Restatement] principles is the consideration that
the law does not impose, by a species of implication of law, as distinguished
from reasonable implication in fact, a duty on the supervisory or executive
corporate employee to assume 4n invitum, functions or responsibilities re-
specting the safety of workmen not placed upon the former by the corpo-
ration itself." Miller v. Muscarelle, 67 N.J. Super. 305, 333, 170 A.2d 437, 452
(1961).
37. "Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be reason-
ably safe for the employees therein." LA. R.S. 23:13 (1964).
38. See note 27 supra.
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The Actual Knowledge Test
The courts in the cases following Adams have adopted the
requirement that the defendant have actual knowledge of the
dangerous condition as well as the authority to remove it.89 If
blindly applied in every case, it seems that the "actual knowl-
edge test" is incompatible with a realistic application of the
Restatement rule. For example, assume that a safety engineer,
whose job function relates solely to the safety of employees,
simply does, nothing toward discharging the duties which he
has undertaken to perform. As a result of his inaction, a hazard-
ous condition develops and an employee is injured. Further,
assume that the safety engineer had no knowledge of the hazard-
ous condition. Application of the "actual knowledge test" would
result in no liability;40 application of the Restatement rule would
certainly result in liability.41 Similarly, when the duty involving
the safety of others has been negligently delegated to obviously
incompetent subordinates,42 liability should result irrespective of
actual knowledge of the particular hazard which causes the
injury.
Actual knowledge would be relevant in the usual case where
the duty has been properly delegated. The agent delegating the
dtUty should be entitled to assume that the duty so delegated is
being properly discharged until he has notice to the contrary.43
When the agent receives such notice, the duty should again
attach until he has taken reasonable steps to remove the hazard.
Statutory Immunity
In an attempt to preserve the integrity of their respective
39. See, e.g., Chaney v. Brupbacher, 242 So.2d 627 (IL App. 4th Cir.
1970); Johnson v. Continental Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 336 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968);
Note, 46 TUr. L. REv. 352, 355 (1971).
40. See Note, 46 TUL. L. REv. 352, 355 (1971).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF AGENCY § 354 (1957). The safety engi-
neer undertook to perform a duty involving the safety of employees.
Further, this undertaking presumably induced the employer to believe that
a safety program was in effect. By failing to act, the safety engineer de-
prived employees of protection which would have been provided by a com-
petent safety engineer.
42. In Spillers v. Northern Assurance Co. of America, 254 So.2d 125, 129
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1971), the court seemed to implicitly recognize that execu-
tives could be liable for the negligent delegation of a duty involving the
safety of third persons.
43. See Miller v. Muscarelle, 67 N.J. Super. 305, 331, 170 A.2d 437, 451
(1961).
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workmen's compensation schemes, a growing minority of juris-
dictions have enacted statutes immunizing coemployees from
suit in tort." The immunity only attaches when the coemployee
is acting in the course of his employment," and does not em-
brace intentional wrongs committed by the coemployee.46
The reality of liability insurance coverage demanded by
executives in a competitive labor market indicates what is prob-
ably the most persuasive argument for statutory immunity in
Louisiana. The increasing number of tort suits directed against
executive officers 47 suggests that the exclusive remedy provision
of our compensation act 48 is becoming less meaningful. The
employer can take little comfort in the knowledge that he is
legally immune from tort liability when, as a matter of prac-
tice, he is compelled to provide liability coverage for executive
officers.4
Conclusion
The Louisiana courts, apparently recognizing the potential
burden on employers of de facto tort liability in addition to
compensation liability without fault, have displayed a restrictive
attitude in the area of executive officer liability. Conflicting
statements of law in recent appellate decisions suggest a need
44. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (1956); CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601
(Deering 1964); COLO. Rv. STAT. § 81-13-8 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2363
(Cum. Supp. 1968); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-8 (1968); ILi. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5
(1969); MIcH. COMP. LAwS § 17.237(827) (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:15-8 (1972);
N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 29(6) (McKinney 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-9 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (1970); ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.154
(1971); S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-401 (1962); TEX. CIV. STAT. art. 8306 (3) (Vernon
1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-1-103 (1968);
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.919 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. 23-2-6a (1970).
45. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.20 (1972).
46. See note 44 supra.
47. See note 5 supra.
48. See note 7 supra.
49. House Bill No. 170, a recent attempt at immunity legislation, was
referred to committee where it received unfavorable consideration. It pro-
vided in pertinent part:
"§ 1101. Employee and employer suits against third persons causing
injury; effect on right to compensation.
"A. As used in this section, the term 'third person' shall mean only a
person other than the employer of the injured employee, and other than
the executive officers, owners, shareholders, agents, or other employees
of the employer." A. H.B. No. 170 (Regular Session, 1972).
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for an expression by the supreme court in this area. It is re-
spectfully urged that the Restatement rule as applied in Spillers
v. Northern Assurance Co. of America5 be adopted as the test
of coemployee tort liability for negligent omissions. Complete
elimination of the liability 1 is surely a matter for the legislature.
John R. Olds
50. 254 So.2d 125 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971). see note 27 supra. See also
Canter v. Koehring Co., 267 So.2d 270 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
51. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
